Part III When Police STINGS Go Wrong
What has been learned other than we all make mistakes is that the police are allowed to engage in deceit, pretence, and trickery to determine whether an individual has an alleged predisposition to commit a crime, and can provide an opportunity for an individual to commit that crime, all without being guilty of entrapment. But things can go wrong for authorities resulting in a reverse effect upon targeted suspects. For example, in San Diego County, 138 tobacco retailers paid an annual licensing fee for police STINGS and the salary of a code enforcement officer who issued and renewed licenses. Those caught selling tobacco to minors faced penalties ranging from $100 to $500 and lost their license. It was argued that because only one of 18 merchants sold illegal products to minors, funds to enforce codes should be refunded to the retailers with interest and tobacco licenses should cost less.
Sometimes, the wrong person is arrested during a STING. For instance, police arrested 32 year old Christi Hernandez in McKinney, Texas after an undercover agent bought cocaine from a woman with a similar name. The McKinney woman said she continues trying to get on with her life but “I lost my job and my life” because of the false accusation. “We apologize to her,” said McKinney Police Chief Doug Kowalski. Nice! Check out my website for more information http://crimeprofessor.com
Another example of things going wrong: Operation Lightning Strike, an FBI STING aimed at trapping NASA personnel and their subcontractors included an agent who pretended to have developed a (phony) devise. Millions were spent on luxury hotel suites, gourmet meals, deep-sea fishing trips, and strip clubs. Agents had few suspects but Strike was a scenario similar to dozens of alleged failed STINGS uncovered by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
STINGS are often justified because of the detrimental effect certain violations have upon quality of life issues or because of the issues police policymakers raise or invent to further their goals.
Both scholars and the courts recognize that law on the books is not “what law is.” Policy and practice associated with STING tactics raises the bar toward unlawful intrusions. For instance, researchers found high rates of unconstitutional police searches in an estimated 30% of police searches (115 searches) conducted by officers in a department ranked in the top 20 percent nationwide. Those officers violated Fourth Amendment prohibitions on searches and seizures. The majority of the unconstitutional searches, 31 out of 34 were invisible to the courts, having resulted in no arrest, charge, or citation. If general searches produce civil rights violations, then it is an easy stone’s throw to argue that since the centerpiece of STING and undercover initiatives is deception, STINGS and undercover initiatives produce similar, if not higher, civil rights violations. The thought paints a troubling picture of police and policymaker practices. It raises difficult questions about discretionary police practices including future decisions to control demonstrators attending the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. Do policymakers randomly have the legal and moral right to freeze the US Constitution? It’s it true that American’s have the right, more than the right “unalienable (cannot be altered by law) Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Social order or social control from the perspective of policymakers takes precedence over due process and gives rise to the question: who polices policymakers from justifying arbitrary police intuition into the daily lives of its citizens?
Implications of arbitrary police strategies tend to increase criminal victimization and citizen dissatisfaction, while the fear of crime and residents’ perceptions of disorder remain unaffected. That is, police strategies linked to STINGS, undercover assignments, and critical incident tactics such as those that will be employed at the political national conventions are counter to respectable behavior because they promote and reward liars, deception, concealment, and betrayal by implying that “the more successful police are in appearing really bad, the more successful they must be in appearing good.” For example, in Raleigh, North Carolina Casey M. McNeel was arrested for purchasing child pornography from an undercover officer in Wilmington. The details of McNeel’s arrested provided by the police implicated McNeel in both child pornography and implied that she was a child molester, too. While in custody, McNeel’s home was invaded and her family was ridiculed by an outraged public demanding reprisal. Because of a lack of police protection, McNeel’s youngest child was attacked by an “unknown” perpetrator and the McNeel’s pet dog was sliced open and left for dead. Subsequently, McNeel lost her job and was brutally attacked when transported to court. It was later learned that an undercover officer participating in the STING lied about McNeel’s purchase and involvement with children. This officer asked his colleagues to lie for him because it was a “good bust,” and getting “pervs off the street is a good thing.” The facts are that the officer had dated McNeel before her marriage to another man and he wanted revenge. McNeel’s parents were fearful to come forward because of the undercover officer’s threats. Her husband wasn’t sure if his wife of 14 years was, indeed, a “child molester” or not and was encouraged by the prosecutor and the police to have their children rape-tested at the hospital. The police’s evidence and testimonies built a strong case against McNeel. “How do you fight city hall?”
A reasonable (Constitutional) expectation of privacy exists even in a STING sex case (i.e. whether a particular place is isolated enough that a reasonable person would see no significant risk of being discovered). The Massachusetts State Police settled a charge on behalf of a gay man who alleged that troopers harassed him at a highway rest stop. The settlement included state police guidelines preventing officers from deliberately trudging into wooded areas near rest stops. The fact is that since enforcement employs deception to detect and record criminal activities, when officers testify against offenders in the courtroom “where the stakes – their jobs, the case,” are much higher, will officers deceive a jury? Other critics argue that the price for more freedom is likely to be less order while the price for more order is likely to be less freedom. However, two thoughts remain:
1. STINGS and undercover initiatives tend to be covert tactics and all of their working components tend to be less publicized as often as their failures.
2. Reported crime has been on the decline and STINGS and undercover initiatives are practiced by many police agencies. Thus, tentative inferences can be endorsed.